Privatizing Aid: The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation Affair

Israel and its allies have introduced quite a number of legal and political configurations over the past 19 months that even the most creative Jessup moot court problem writers would not dare to imagine. One such staggering development was the announcement of a new plan to replace the United Nations (UN) agencies that were vital in the provision of humanitarian aid in Gaza. The UN is to be replaced not by an alternative international organization or a state-run program but by a private foundation – the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” (GHF) – that will execute its aid program together with the private security firm, “Safe Reach Solutions”. The daunting question now is: on what basis is outsourcing core humanitarian functions to private actors legally or ethically defensible? Before turning to a few legal reasons why this model is deeply problematic, here is what we know so far about GHF and its operational plans.

The mystery of the GHF

The GHF was established in February 2025, around the time when Israeli legislation was passed seeking to bar UNRWA from operating in the occupied Palestinian territories. The GHF is registered as a nonprofit organization both in the US and Switzerland and is envisioned as a privately administered vehicle to deliver aid into Gaza without the involvement of international humanitarian organizations traditionally active in such settings. The Foundation will be partnered with a private security firm owned by Philip F. Reilly, a former senior CIA officer, to oversee logistics and access routes. Many might argue that the method of aid delivery is secondary, so long as those starving receive food and water. However, there are serious legal and ethical concerns surrounding this particular arrangement.

Under this new plan, initially, four aid distribution sites located in southern Gaza will be established, and to reach them, Gazans will have to walk across the Israeli military line. This will inevitably concentrate aid in a few fixed points, which will endanger civilians as they have to cross militarized zones on foot and will likely provoke permanent forced displacement from northern Gaza, paving the way for Israel’s settlements and annexation plan. There is no transparency about who will oversee the work of the Foundation, how decisions on aid distribution will be made, or what principles, if any, will guide its operation.

It is similarly unknown who funds the enormously expensive GHF’s mandate of feeding more than a million people and hiring thousands of security guards, with Israel claiming not to fund this mission. What is clear, though, is that the move reflects a deep political desire to dismantle the existing humanitarian infrastructure in Gaza, and replace it with a framework controlled by actors more palatable to Israel and its allies. The coalition of aid and human rights NGOs described the GHF as “a project led by politically connected Western security and military figures, coordinated in tandem with the Israeli government, and launched while the people of Gaza remain under total siege. It lacks any Palestinian involvement in its design or implementation.” So, whether this constitutes a “humanitarian innovation” or an erosion of international legal obligations of an occupying power depends on where one stands. But legally, the warning signs are flashing red.

Which wrong? Whose conduct?

So what happens to international humanitarian law when humanitarian aid is no longer coordinated by impartial international organizations but handed over to private foundations and security companies? The GHF is not simply another NGO. Unlike the International Committee of the Red Cross, which derives its mandate directly from the Geneva Conventions and longstanding state recognition, or UN agencies with intergovernmental oversight, the GHF is a domestically incorporated private entity with no international legal status, no treaty-based mandate, and most importantly, it operates without the institutional safeguards of neutrality, independence, and impartiality that are foundational to international humanitarian action.

IHL assumes that relief actions are carried out either by states or by impartial humanitarian organizations accepted by the parties to the conflict (Common Article 3, AP I, Article 70, GC IV Articles 59 and 60). In Gaza, however, we are witnessing the construction of an aid model that appears deliberately designed to sideline these principles. Even the former executive director of GHF, who resigned one day before the operations were about to start, stated that the decision to resign is motivated by the inability of the GHF to adhere to “the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence […].” And this should all be viewed in the context of the systematic denial of access to neutral humanitarian actors, which contributes to the war crime of starvation (AP I Article 54 and Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute). Thus, replacing a neutral, multilateral aid framework with a politically affiliated, privately-run mechanism, funded by actors with close ties to the occupying power, risks breaching Israel’s obligations under the Geneva Conventions, not only in terms of facilitating humanitarian relief, but in ensuring it is delivered according to humanitarian law.

Let’s also not forget about the hired private security company (PSC) in all this unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The involvement of such actors in the provision of humanitarian aid in the disastrous conditions of Gaza introduces a for-profit, security-first logic into what should be a rights-based humanitarian operation. Moreover, in Gaza, where access to aid has already been severely restricted and plans for its annexation outlined, the PSC’s presence may facilitate serious violations of international law. Reports have emerged of fatal shootings at aid distribution points (though it remains unclear whether fire was opened by Israeli forces or the PSC). Besides, the strategic location of distribution points raises concerns about the forcible transfer or displacement of civilians (GC IV Article 49). TRIAL International has already submitted legal filings in Switzerland, urging authorities to investigate whether GHF’s and its partner’s activities violate Swiss and international law, especially in light of evidence that this new aid model could serve Israel’s goal of depopulating northern Gaza.

This whole GHF story is not a matter of ideological disagreement about how best to deliver aid – it is a matter of law. When aid is distributed in a way that serves military objectives, bypasses neutral channels, and limits access for segments of the civilian population, we are no longer dealing with humanitarian relief as defined under IHL. We are witnessing a political project disguised as aid. But the question remains: who bears legal responsibility – Israel, the GHF, or both?

Outsourcing and privatization under international law

Privatization of public functions is by now a familiar story. States outsource, delegate, and partner with private actors across all sectors. International law mostly looked the other way, content with reaffirming that state obligations under human rights and humanitarian law remain intact, even when the state disappears behind a contractual veil. In other words, outsourcing does not always mean illegal offloading of obligations and responsibilities. But the GHF’s involvement in Gaza is not just another case of a state retreating from service provision. It is a troubling example of a governmental function, i.e., the facilitation of humanitarian relief in occupied territory, being repackaged as a private humanitarian venture with geopolitical and military implications.

What is at stake here is not simply the legality of letting private actors into the aid space. It is the transformation of a legal obligation under international humanitarian law into a privatized, discretionary act. As discussed above, Israel, as the occupying power, is bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention. It must ensure the provision of essentials for the civilian population and must facilitate relief schemes by impartial humanitarian organizations. It does not get to pick and choose which civilians deserve aid, or which actors it deems politically palatable.

International law scholars have long debated whether privatization modifies the nature of state obligations. The usual answer is no, but it does complicate how these obligations are met and enforced. As the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has made clear, states must regulate and monitor private service providers, and they remain responsible for ensuring services remain accessible, adequate, and rights-compliant. But what happens when privatization is not just about logistics or efficiency, but is intentionally used to bypass the scrutiny, neutrality, and access requirements that public providers like the UN agencies would otherwise ensure?

The previous section outlined potential violations of international law by both Israel and the GHF and co, but nobody has offered us a framework for responsibility – neither Israel, nor US and Switzerland, where the GHF is registered, nor its secret funders. In the absence of the answers, we should turn to the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Under Article 5, conduct by a private entity exercising elements of governmental authority may be attributable to the state when the entity is empowered by the law of that state to exercise such authority. The GHF or the PSCs perform functions that are typically the prerogative of the state, e.g., controlling access to humanitarian aid, securing the access points. Even if Israel claims not to be involved in the operations of the GHF, as it is supposed to be neutral, attribution may still arise under Article 8 ARSIWA where a state exercises “effective control” over the actor’s conduct. We will have to closely monitor the situation to see if Israel indeed directs or closely coordinates GHF’s operations by selecting its operational zones, approving its personnel, or vetting beneficiaries but it is hard to imagine that the GHF’s presence in Gaza is possible without that.

Furthermore, Israel’s obligations under IHL, as discussed above, require that humanitarian relief be facilitated impartially and without discrimination. Delegating this responsibility to a politically affiliated private actor, lacking impartiality and transparency, arguably undermines these duties. Even if the acts of the GHF or PSCs are hard to attribute to Israel, Israel may still bear responsibility for violating its own obligations by outsourcing aid in a manner incompatible with international law. Thus, privatization, in this context, is not a shield from legal responsibility; it is a potential modality of wrongful conduct.                                     

The GHF or nothing at all?

The question is not whether starving people should receive aid from GHF or be left to die. That binary is itself the product manufactured by Israel famine and dire humanitarian crisis, in which existing rights-based aid infrastructures were deliberately obstructed. They were not originally absent. As UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher told the Security Council, the GHF plan “makes aid conditional on political and military aims. It makes starvation a bargaining chip. It is cynical sideshow. A deliberate distraction. A fig leaf for further violence and displacement.”

Framing GHF as the only viable option for delivering aid in Gaza erases both the illegality of the blockade and the deliberate sidelining of international humanitarian operations. It also obscures a deeper shift: the erosion of legal obligation through privatization. The GHF may be formally incorporated, but it operates under the patronage of the occupying power and without the impartiality, transparency, or oversight that international law demands. Replacing UN agencies with a private foundation and a private security firm further signals the political reframing of Gaza as a site outside the normal rules of international law – treated not as an international issue governed by law-bound institutions, but as a domestic, manageable problem. We are witnessing the emergence of ‘privatized humanitarianism’ as a political project that reframes humanitarian relief not as a legal obligation flowing from international law, but as a matter of discretionary benevolence delivered by private actors.

The danger is not only that private actors fill the vacuum, but that they are used to create it. What is being dismantled is not just aid delivery, but the very legal architecture meant to constrain wartime power and protect civilian life. The international community must resist legitimizing this model. The solution is not to invent new privatized techniques for dealing with man-made famine. It is to confront and stop the conditions producing it: the blockade, the denial of humanitarian access, and the instrumentalization of aid as a weapon.