The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant weaknesses in the global legal framework for pandemics. In response, in 2021, WHO member states launched negotiations to develop a new pandemic agreement aimed at addressing the gaps revealed by the pandemic. After three years of negotiations, on 20 May 2025, the 78th World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution by way of a resolution. This is only the second time since the WHO’s founding in 1948 that the World Health Assembly has adopted an international agreement—the first being the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. It marks a significant institutional and legal milestone, reflecting a major shift in approach by placing equity and solidarity at the forefront of pandemic prevention and response. Still, the agreement’s true impact will depend on a range of short- and long-term factors, which we explore in the following post.
Shift in Values
International public health emergencies and pandemics are governed by the International Health Regulations (IHR) (originally adopted in 1969 and most recently amended in 2024) and the new Pandemic Agreement. While the IHR is a functional instrument and aims at preventing the international spread of disease, the pandemic agreement marks a shift: it puts equity and solidarity between countries at the forefront. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant discrepancies between developed and developing nations, particularly in access to vaccines, medications, and diagnostics. Thus, the agreement embeds equity and solidarity principles (Article 3) into concrete, actionable provisions to remove country inequalities in pandemic prevention, preparation, and response.
Scope
To this end, the agreement includes 35 articles, many of which regulate issues that were previously not governed by international law. Among the key provisions are the One Health approach (Article 5), strengthening regulatory systems (Article 8), international cooperation on research and development (Article 9), strengthening local production capacity in developing countries (Article 10), technology transfer (Article 11), Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) (Article 12), and securing pandemic-related goods supply chains (Article 13).
Different priorities between developed and developing countries were a major fault line in the negotiations. Developing countries pushed for commitments to ensure equitable access to vaccines and other pandemic-related health products, while wealthier states focused on measures that would prevent outbreaks. Thus, developing countries wanted binding technology transfer obligations, a strong PABS mechanism, and other provisions that would strengthen their R&D and production self-sufficiency. Developed countries pushed to institutionalize the One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health and aims to prevent zoonotic spillovers.
In the end, the agreement was significantly watered down and compromised on language: technology transfer would be “as mutually agreed”—effectively, voluntary. The parties decided to negotiate PABS individually because the debate was so contentious (see below). And while the final text is the first international legal agreement to formally recognize the One Health approach, its requirements are limited.
Legal Force and Enforcement
The agreement has an ambitious scope, but has limited legal force. Many of its provisions defer to national circumstances, with commitments hedged by phrases like “based on national capacities,” “subject to available resources,” or “within the means of the Party concerned.” These terms effectively create loopholes, allowing states to opt out of implementation without technically violating the agreement. To obtain a multilateral agreement, member states had to use this “soft law” strategy.
Moreover, the agreement does not include compliance or enforcement measures. It introduces “soft” monitoring mechanisms like state reporting requirements (Article 21), a Secretariat (Article 22), and a Conference of the Parties (COP) (Article 19) (see below), but these institutions are expressly non-adversarial and non-punitive. The WHO and other states have no legal enforcement or intervention authority, maintaining national sovereignty. This approach reflects a broader reluctance among states to permit international intervention in domestic affairs. It underscores how protective governments remain of their sovereignty.
Recognizing developing countries’ capacity challenges, Article 18 requires states to strengthen sustainable and predictable financing, and Article 18(3) creates a Coordinating Financial Mechanism. However, there is no requirement to provide fixed contributions. Instead, the language uses soft pledges like “mobilize,” “encourage,” and “promote.” Thus, financial support is unpredictable and discretionary at this point. The terms of reference and modalities of the Mechanism will be proposed by the IGWG and shall be adopted by the COP within one year after the entry into force of the agreement.
Governance
The agreement establishes a COP (Article 19) to monitor implementation, a notable institutional innovation in the global health context. The COP provides a platform that will keep pandemic preparedness and response on the global agenda. Its potential matches that of the UNFCCC COP, which has sustained political momentum on climate change. The IGWG will further determine details of the COP following agreement on the PABS annex, and the first COP session shall be convened within one year after the entry into force of the agreement (see below).
The Effect of the U.S. Not Being a Party
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the WHO, and by extension from the pandemic agreement, has raised concerns about the consequences for the agreement’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Given its political and economic power, the US is considered essential to multilateral agreements.
That said, this isn’t unprecedented. The U.S. has often refused to approve or ratify multilateral agreements. It never joined the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court. It has also stayed out of the Convention on Biological Diversity and withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement. Despite these absences, such treaties have still gone ahead with global buy-in and implementation. Indeed, it was adopted by the WHA on the 20th of May (following approval by 124 member states in Committee A).
While the absence of the U.S. may affect other states’ domestic ratification processes, for the agreement to take effect, 60 countries must ratify it, and since many of the agreement’s benefits favor developing countries, this barrier is likely to be met.
Legal force, however, is distinct from impact. And this is where the absence of the U.S. poses real challenges. The U.S. has many of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies and research organizations. Thus, without U.S. involvement, these institutions won’t be required, incentivized, or encouraged to collaborate or participate. For example:
Article 9 requires the inclusion of equitable access conditions in publicly funded research and development contracts. U.S.-funded institutions, central to global health research, wouldn’t be required to comply.
Article 10 requires countries to promote or incentivize public or private sector investments aimed at geographically diversifying production facilities in developing countries—efforts that would not include U.S. support.
Article 11 encourages the transfer of technology to developing countries. U.S. firms would be under no encouragement to participate.
Article 14 calls for including equitable access provisions in public procurement policies, particularly benefiting developing countries—but these wouldn’t apply to the U.S.
Another crucial issue is funding. As mentioned above, the agreement includes Article 18 to mobilize financial resources, but without U.S. contributions, its financial foundation would be weaker.
One important nuance is the PABS (see below). If adopted, U.S.-based companies will need to enter into contracts with the WHO (Article 12(6)(a) if they want to get access to pathogen samples. Much like how U.S. companies navigate the Convention on Biological Diversity’s access and benefit-sharing requirements under the Nagoya Protocol. Their involvement would, however, be market-driven because of their desire to get access to pathogen data.
PABS and Entry Into Force
The PABS system is intended to ensure that countries sharing pathogens with pandemic potential—or their genetic sequence data—receive a fair share of the benefits derived from them. However, during negotiations, PABS emerged as one of the most divisive issues.
To avoid derailing the agreement, negotiators compromised by including just guiding principles in Article 12, deferring the details to a separate PABS instrument to be established later and annexed to the agreement (Article 12(2)). Member states have resolved to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), which shall meet by 15 July 2025 to continue the negotiation on the PABS.
However, the unresolved PABS instrument has the potential to stall—or even block—the entire agreement. The reason is that member states have agreed (Article 31(2)) that the agreement will not be open for signature until the PABS annex is adopted. In doing so, member states have taken a risk. Although the IGWG has to submit the PABS negotiations’ outcome at the 79th WHA in 2026, it will likely take longer to negotiate an instrument. Complex and contentious questions include how much benefit will be shared, how pathogens are tracked, and how the PABS mechanism will interact with the new Cali Fund under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Further, Article 33 states that the agreement can only enter into force once at least 60 countries ratify it. In many cases, this will involve lengthy domestic approval processes, further slowing entry into force and implementation.
This raises a strategic question: was it wise for countries to require that the signature be contingent on resolving the politically charged PABS issue? Developing countries stand to benefit from many other provisions in the agreement, even without a finalized PABS system. By tying the fate of the entire agreement to the uncertain outcome of the PABS negotiations, negotiators may have jeopardized progress on broader pandemic preparedness and response.
Conclusion
From both legal and policy standpoints, the pandemic agreement’s primary contribution is not in binding, enforceable legal rules but in establishing a global normative framework. It helps establish pandemic preparedness and response as a global priority. Notably, it operationalizes essential principles—especially equity and solidarity—and brings under international law a range of issues that had previously not been regulated. It also creates institutional foundations like the COP. Over time, this platform may support deeper cooperation and potentially pave the way for more robust legal and institutional arrangements.
However, as previously noted, tying the agreement’s signature to the unresolved PABS negotiations introduces significant delays. The additional fact that U.S. companies—major players in the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors—will not be required by the U.S. government to undertake certain actions undermines the agreement’s potential reach and effectiveness. These are not minor hurdles; they are structural challenges that could define the agreement’s real-world impact.
Still, this agreement reveals a broader truth about the current state of multilateralism: what’s possible today often comes with weak legal language, limited enforcement, and no third-party oversight. While that may disappoint some—and it certainly falls short of the ideal of binding international law—it’s still significant that countries were able to agree on core issues and establish a common platform. That achievement shouldn’t be dismissed.
Indeed, it seems member states felt a need to demonstrate that multilateralism remains viable. As a result, they chose to leave several critical elements for future development—not only the PABS system, but also the Financial Coordination Mechanism, the terms of reference for the Conference of the Parties (COP), and other components (Article 9 of the resolution).
That said, the true test of this agreement’s value will come down to political will and sustained financing. Thus, while the agreement reflects a shift in political mindset—placing equity and solidarity at the center of pandemic response—it remains to be seen whether this framework will lead to a measurably more equitable global response in future crises.
The Pandemic Agreement: A Milestone in Global Health, but Will it Work?
Written by Ayelet Berman and Indira Dewi KantianaThe COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant weaknesses in the global legal framework for pandemics. In response, in 2021, WHO member states launched negotiations to develop a new pandemic agreement aimed at addressing the gaps revealed by the pandemic. After three years of negotiations, on 20 May 2025, the 78th World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution by way of a resolution. This is only the second time since the WHO’s founding in 1948 that the World Health Assembly has adopted an international agreement—the first being the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. It marks a significant institutional and legal milestone, reflecting a major shift in approach by placing equity and solidarity at the forefront of pandemic prevention and response. Still, the agreement’s true impact will depend on a range of short- and long-term factors, which we explore in the following post.
Shift in Values
International public health emergencies and pandemics are governed by the International Health Regulations (IHR) (originally adopted in 1969 and most recently amended in 2024) and the new Pandemic Agreement. While the IHR is a functional instrument and aims at preventing the international spread of disease, the pandemic agreement marks a shift: it puts equity and solidarity between countries at the forefront. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant discrepancies between developed and developing nations, particularly in access to vaccines, medications, and diagnostics. Thus, the agreement embeds equity and solidarity principles (Article 3) into concrete, actionable provisions to remove country inequalities in pandemic prevention, preparation, and response.
Scope
To this end, the agreement includes 35 articles, many of which regulate issues that were previously not governed by international law. Among the key provisions are the One Health approach (Article 5), strengthening regulatory systems (Article 8), international cooperation on research and development (Article 9), strengthening local production capacity in developing countries (Article 10), technology transfer (Article 11), Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) (Article 12), and securing pandemic-related goods supply chains (Article 13).
Different priorities between developed and developing countries were a major fault line in the negotiations. Developing countries pushed for commitments to ensure equitable access to vaccines and other pandemic-related health products, while wealthier states focused on measures that would prevent outbreaks. Thus, developing countries wanted binding technology transfer obligations, a strong PABS mechanism, and other provisions that would strengthen their R&D and production self-sufficiency. Developed countries pushed to institutionalize the One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health and aims to prevent zoonotic spillovers.
In the end, the agreement was significantly watered down and compromised on language: technology transfer would be “as mutually agreed”—effectively, voluntary. The parties decided to negotiate PABS individually because the debate was so contentious (see below). And while the final text is the first international legal agreement to formally recognize the One Health approach, its requirements are limited.
Legal Force and Enforcement
The agreement has an ambitious scope, but has limited legal force. Many of its provisions defer to national circumstances, with commitments hedged by phrases like “based on national capacities,” “subject to available resources,” or “within the means of the Party concerned.” These terms effectively create loopholes, allowing states to opt out of implementation without technically violating the agreement. To obtain a multilateral agreement, member states had to use this “soft law” strategy.
Moreover, the agreement does not include compliance or enforcement measures. It introduces “soft” monitoring mechanisms like state reporting requirements (Article 21), a Secretariat (Article 22), and a Conference of the Parties (COP) (Article 19) (see below), but these institutions are expressly non-adversarial and non-punitive. The WHO and other states have no legal enforcement or intervention authority, maintaining national sovereignty. This approach reflects a broader reluctance among states to permit international intervention in domestic affairs. It underscores how protective governments remain of their sovereignty.
Recognizing developing countries’ capacity challenges, Article 18 requires states to strengthen sustainable and predictable financing, and Article 18(3) creates a Coordinating Financial Mechanism. However, there is no requirement to provide fixed contributions. Instead, the language uses soft pledges like “mobilize,” “encourage,” and “promote.” Thus, financial support is unpredictable and discretionary at this point. The terms of reference and modalities of the Mechanism will be proposed by the IGWG and shall be adopted by the COP within one year after the entry into force of the agreement.
Governance
The agreement establishes a COP (Article 19) to monitor implementation, a notable institutional innovation in the global health context. The COP provides a platform that will keep pandemic preparedness and response on the global agenda. Its potential matches that of the UNFCCC COP, which has sustained political momentum on climate change. The IGWG will further determine details of the COP following agreement on the PABS annex, and the first COP session shall be convened within one year after the entry into force of the agreement (see below).
The Effect of the U.S. Not Being a Party
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the WHO, and by extension from the pandemic agreement, has raised concerns about the consequences for the agreement’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Given its political and economic power, the US is considered essential to multilateral agreements.
That said, this isn’t unprecedented. The U.S. has often refused to approve or ratify multilateral agreements. It never joined the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court. It has also stayed out of the Convention on Biological Diversity and withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement. Despite these absences, such treaties have still gone ahead with global buy-in and implementation. Indeed, it was adopted by the WHA on the 20th of May (following approval by 124 member states in Committee A).
While the absence of the U.S. may affect other states’ domestic ratification processes, for the agreement to take effect, 60 countries must ratify it, and since many of the agreement’s benefits favor developing countries, this barrier is likely to be met.
Legal force, however, is distinct from impact. And this is where the absence of the U.S. poses real challenges. The U.S. has many of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies and research organizations. Thus, without U.S. involvement, these institutions won’t be required, incentivized, or encouraged to collaborate or participate. For example:
Article 9 requires the inclusion of equitable access conditions in publicly funded research and development contracts. U.S.-funded institutions, central to global health research, wouldn’t be required to comply.
Article 10 requires countries to promote or incentivize public or private sector investments aimed at geographically diversifying production facilities in developing countries—efforts that would not include U.S. support.
Article 11 encourages the transfer of technology to developing countries. U.S. firms would be under no encouragement to participate.
Article 14 calls for including equitable access provisions in public procurement policies, particularly benefiting developing countries—but these wouldn’t apply to the U.S.
Another crucial issue is funding. As mentioned above, the agreement includes Article 18 to mobilize financial resources, but without U.S. contributions, its financial foundation would be weaker.
One important nuance is the PABS (see below). If adopted, U.S.-based companies will need to enter into contracts with the WHO (Article 12(6)(a) if they want to get access to pathogen samples. Much like how U.S. companies navigate the Convention on Biological Diversity’s access and benefit-sharing requirements under the Nagoya Protocol. Their involvement would, however, be market-driven because of their desire to get access to pathogen data.
PABS and Entry Into Force
The PABS system is intended to ensure that countries sharing pathogens with pandemic potential—or their genetic sequence data—receive a fair share of the benefits derived from them. However, during negotiations, PABS emerged as one of the most divisive issues.
To avoid derailing the agreement, negotiators compromised by including just guiding principles in Article 12, deferring the details to a separate PABS instrument to be established later and annexed to the agreement (Article 12(2)). Member states have resolved to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), which shall meet by 15 July 2025 to continue the negotiation on the PABS.
However, the unresolved PABS instrument has the potential to stall—or even block—the entire agreement. The reason is that member states have agreed (Article 31(2)) that the agreement will not be open for signature until the PABS annex is adopted. In doing so, member states have taken a risk. Although the IGWG has to submit the PABS negotiations’ outcome at the 79th WHA in 2026, it will likely take longer to negotiate an instrument. Complex and contentious questions include how much benefit will be shared, how pathogens are tracked, and how the PABS mechanism will interact with the new Cali Fund under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Further, Article 33 states that the agreement can only enter into force once at least 60 countries ratify it. In many cases, this will involve lengthy domestic approval processes, further slowing entry into force and implementation.
This raises a strategic question: was it wise for countries to require that the signature be contingent on resolving the politically charged PABS issue? Developing countries stand to benefit from many other provisions in the agreement, even without a finalized PABS system. By tying the fate of the entire agreement to the uncertain outcome of the PABS negotiations, negotiators may have jeopardized progress on broader pandemic preparedness and response.
Conclusion
From both legal and policy standpoints, the pandemic agreement’s primary contribution is not in binding, enforceable legal rules but in establishing a global normative framework. It helps establish pandemic preparedness and response as a global priority. Notably, it operationalizes essential principles—especially equity and solidarity—and brings under international law a range of issues that had previously not been regulated. It also creates institutional foundations like the COP. Over time, this platform may support deeper cooperation and potentially pave the way for more robust legal and institutional arrangements.
However, as previously noted, tying the agreement’s signature to the unresolved PABS negotiations introduces significant delays. The additional fact that U.S. companies—major players in the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors—will not be required by the U.S. government to undertake certain actions undermines the agreement’s potential reach and effectiveness. These are not minor hurdles; they are structural challenges that could define the agreement’s real-world impact.
Still, this agreement reveals a broader truth about the current state of multilateralism: what’s possible today often comes with weak legal language, limited enforcement, and no third-party oversight. While that may disappoint some—and it certainly falls short of the ideal of binding international law—it’s still significant that countries were able to agree on core issues and establish a common platform. That achievement shouldn’t be dismissed.
Indeed, it seems member states felt a need to demonstrate that multilateralism remains viable. As a result, they chose to leave several critical elements for future development—not only the PABS system, but also the Financial Coordination Mechanism, the terms of reference for the Conference of the Parties (COP), and other components (Article 9 of the resolution).
That said, the true test of this agreement’s value will come down to political will and sustained financing. Thus, while the agreement reflects a shift in political mindset—placing equity and solidarity at the center of pandemic response—it remains to be seen whether this framework will lead to a measurably more equitable global response in future crises.
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