In a prior post on this blog, I examined whether the existing framework of international crimes—namely, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—could be mobilized to address the systemic exploitation and killing of animals. I concluded that the relevance of these crimes to such conducts is, at best, incidental. Primarily designed to protect human beings, international crimes offer legal safeguards to animals only indirectly, namely when the harm inflicted also affects human welfare. More fundamentally, such crimes were crafted to target exceptional human crises: armed conflict (war crimes), widespread or systematic attacks against civilian populations (crimes against humanity), and acts of extermination against specific human groups (genocide). They were never intended to confront the “normalized” structural violence routinely inflicted upon animals through practices like industrial farming, scientific experimentation, and habitat destruction. Yet, such forms of violence produce immense suffering and the mass death of animals on a global scale.
By contrast, the emerging legal concept of ecocide may offer a more conceptually promising and structurally inclusive regime. Unlike established international crimes, ecocide does not ground its normative foundation solely on the defense of human beings. Rather, it seeks to protect the environment as an autonomous legal interest—an entity external to, yet constitutive of, human existence, and one that intrinsically includes animals. By recognizing the environment as a subject of legal value in its own right, ecocide opens the possibility, at least in principle, of holding individuals—and, ideally corporate and institutional actors—accountable for large-scale harm inflicted upon animals, even where no direct injury to humans can be demonstrated.
This post explores how ecocide, as an emerging legal concept, could serve as a viable mechanism to address the mass confinement, abuse, and slaughter of animals in factory farming and other industrial practices (for a preliminary analysis of this issue, see here, pp. 8-10). For the purposes of this analysis, I rely on the definition suggested in 2021 by the Independent Expert Panel convened under the auspices of the Stop Ecocide International foundation. This definition—which has informed the proposals of Vanuatu, Fiji, and Samoa Islands to amend the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—reads as follows: “Ecocide means unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.” At the core of this framework lie three key conditions: first, that the act in question is either unlawful or wanton; second, that it results in environmental damage that is both severe and either widespread or long-term; and third, that the perpetrator had knowledge of the substantial likelihood of such harm. Each of these criteria presents specific challenges when applied to the systemic exploitation and slaughtering of animals, which will be examined in turn.
Defining the “Environment”: Do Animals Count?
Before evaluating the above constitutive elements, it is essential to consider whether animals—particularly those raised for food, such as cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens, ducks, or turkey—fall within the legal concept of the “environment.” The 2021 Expert Panel offers a broad definition of the environment which covers “the earth, its biosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, as well as outer space.” On its face, this definition appears to focus primarily on ecosystems and their associated wildlife. The status of domesticated animals is less clear. Indeed, these animals are often viewed through the lens of human utility, treated as economic assets rather than as integral parts of ecological systems. Under this traditional understanding, livestock are considered component of the environment only indirectly, namely when their exploitation leads to environmental degradation, such as deforestation, pollution, or greenhouse gas emissions. However, a more progressive interpretation—such as that advanced by A. Peters (here, p. 358) in the context of the laws of warfare, who notes that domesticated animals “are, after all, ‘natural’ and not man-made”—supports the inclusion of such animals within the notion of the environment. When this interpretation is considered alongside the growing ethical, legal, and scientific recognition of animal sentience, it becomes possible to conceptualized harm to animals—both wild and domesticated—as a direct form of environmental damage. On this reading, the suffering and death of farmed animals are not merely instrumental concerns (i.e., relevant only insofar as they affect ecosystems), but rather constitute intrinsic harm to the ecological whole. Environmental damage, in this broader sense, includes harm inflicted directly on domesticated animals themselves—not merely the secondary effects of their exploitation on the environment (for further discussion on the limitations of ecocide regime in addressing animal welfare, see the thought-provoking analysis of D. Legge and S. Brooman on ‘animal ecocide’, pp. 212–214).
Unlawfulness or Wantonness of Animal Exploitation
Having clarified the meaning of “environment,” I may now turn to the first foundational criterion of ecocide: the requirement that the act causing environmental harm be either unlawful or wanton (for a discussion of the challenges raised by these elements, see here). Presently, it cannot be argued that animal exploitation and killing for food is broadly unlawful. Indeed, such practices are legally permitted in most jurisdictions and are not prohibited under international law. Even existing animal welfare statutes generally operate within the framework that accepts ongoing exploitation, aiming primarily to minimize suffering rather than to challenge the legality of the practice itself (see here, p. 7; for a mapping of anti-cruelty laws, see here).
At first glance, the concept of wantonness, by contrast, may offer a more robust legal grounding for the protection of livestock. As defined by the Expert Panel, wanton acts are those undertaken with “reckless disregard for damage which would be clearly excessive in relation to the social and economic benefits anticipated.” While this standard appears promising, its application to animal agriculture presents considerable complexity. The livestock industry is not only deeply entrenched in global economic systems but is also widely portrayed—albeit with growing contestation—as essential to food security and socio-economic development. Consequently, determining whether the exploitation of animals meets the threshold of wantonness ultimately hinges on how courts evaluate the gravity of environmental harm and animal suffering in relation to the purported societal and economic benefits.
In other legal contexts, environmental damage has at times been tolerated where it serves urgent human needs—such as the construction of dams to prevent catastrophic flooding—or when the anticipated economic gains are deemed to outweigh the ecological costs. However, this utilitarian calculus becomes far more ethically and legally problematic when extended to sentient animals, particularly those raised in industrialized factory farming systems. Unlike inert environmental features, these animals are capable of experiencing pain, fear, and distress—qualities that fundamentally shift the moral and legal stakes. This raises a crucial yet often neglected question (first suggested to me by Lammert van Raan, former Dutch MP and initiator of the ecocide bill of July 2023): can the conditions under which such animals are confined—and ultimately slaughtered—ever be justified by any benefit to the animals themselves? In the overwhelming majority of cases, the answer is unequivocally negative. There exists no compensatory benefit to the animals that could plausibly offset the severe and often prolonged suffering they endure. This lack of justification underscores a fundamental asymmetry: the harm inflicted is vast and direct, while any alleged benefit accrues solely to humans. Under the standard of wantonness, such disproportionality renders the practice especially suspect. If courts were to fully account not only for the environmental degradation wrought by industrial agriculture but also for its direct, systemic impact on sentient beings, the balance of interests might change decisively. Such a reassessment could lead to the pivotal conclusion that these practices, far from being necessary or proportionate, in fact constitute wanton acts in violation of established international legal norms.
Finally, it is worth noting a significant divergence in national legislative approaches to these elements which may impact the protection of animal welfare. For example, the Dutch ecocide bill deliberately omits any requirement that the act be unlawful or wanton. Instead, it focuses solely on the scale and severity of the environmental harm caused. This broader, harm-based formulation provides a more flexible and expansive legal foundation—one that could, in principle, encompass the environmental consequences of animal exploitation, even when such practices remain legally permitted. By contrast, the Belgian law on ecocide adopted on 22 February 2024 embraces a markedly narrower conception, explicitly requiring that the act in question be unlawful—more specifically, according to the Belgian Conseil d’État, that it constitutes a violation of federal legislations or international regulations. This requirement imposes a stringent legal constraint, significantly limiting the scope of the ecocide framework. As a result, practices involving animal exploitation fall outside the reach of the Belgian law unless they are already explicitly prohibited under Belgian federal law or international law, regardless of their potentially devastating impact on ecosystems, biodiversity, and animal welfare
Severity, Scope, and Duration of Harm Caused to Animals
According to the second criteria, ecocide must involve environmental harm that is both severe and either widespread or long-term. Whether animal exploitation meets this threshold depends on the conception of “harm” and “environment” adopted. If one adheres to the conventional understanding—where animal suffering is relevant only insofar as it contributes to broader ecological damage—then ecocide liability depends on proving that the environmental consequences of animal exploitation are sufficiently grave, widespread or long-term. Mounting scientific evidence supports this view: industrial livestock production is a major driver of deforestation, biodiversity loss, water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions (see here, and here). By contrast, the progressive interpretation—where harm to animals is itself environmental harm—could further facilitate the possibility of reaching ecocide threshold. Indeed, the suffering endured by sentient beings in industrial farming is undoubtedly severe. The scale of harm is widespread, affecting over 500 million land animals daily, not including aquatic species. The question of whether such harm can be deemed long-term is more nuanced. From a species-level perspective, livestock are not at risk of extinction; their populations are systematically replenished to meet continuous human demand. However, if the legal lens shifts from the aggregate species to the experiential standpoint of the individual animal, a markedly different assessment arises. Each animal subjected to this system suffers an irreversible and premature death—an enduring and irremediable harm when viewed through the prism of individual sentience.
Knowledge of Likely Harm Caused to Animals
Finally, to establish ecocide, the perpetrator must possess the knowledge of a substantial likelihood that their actions will result in severe and either widespread or long-term environmental harm. As with other constitutive elements of the offence, the interpretation of the mental requirement is closely tied to the broader definitional question of whether—and how—livestock animals are considered part of the environment. On the one hand, under the traditional approach, it may be challenging to demonstrate intent or knowledge that environmental harm results primarily from the indirect consequences of animal exploitation. Typically, environmental degradation is regarded as an unintended and unforeseen side effect of otherwise lawful activities—although this view is increasingly being challenged. This raises complex issues about the standard of intent that ultimately needs to be adopted: should the perpetrator have acted with direct intent, indirect intent (dolus eventualis), or merely recklessness (for a discussion on the mental element of ecocide, see here)? On the other hand, if the progressive interpretation referred to above is retained, the legal analysis varies significantly. From this perspective, the exploitation and killing of farm animals are deliberate acts, carried out with full awareness of their consequences. Indeed, in light of the now well-established scientific evidence of animal sentience, such harm can no longer be dismissed as incidental. Rather, it constitutes the direct and foreseeable consequence of deliberate practices, carried out with full awareness of their significant and unavoidable impact on animal well-being.
Concluding Reflections: Ecocide, a Normative Point of Departure
The potential for the emerging crime of ecocide to serve as a meaningful legal instrument against the exploitation and mass killing of domesticated animals rests on a complex set of interrelated interpretive determinations. Chief among these are the definitional scope of the term “environment”, the extent to which this definition shapes the application of elements such as unlawfulness or wantonness, the assessment of whether harm to animals meets the ecocide threshold, and the requisite mental state of the perpetrator. While the current legal architecture of ecocide was not originally conceived to address the suffering of animals, it nonetheless offers a conceptual starting point for future legal evolution. Still, it should be regarded more as a foundational reference than a fully developed legal instrument for confronting widespread and serious harm to animals in farming activities. Under present legal and political constraints, it is exceedingly unlikely that a national prosecutor—or the ICC Prosecutor—would initiate proceedings against those involve in industrial farming practices solely on the basis of the current definition of ecocide, especially in the absence of a clear legal mandate and a broad societal consensus that such practices are intolerable and must be curtailed. Any such prosecution would almost certainly be viewed as incompatible with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
This legal caution must, however, be nuanced in light of the two interpretive approaches outlined above. Clearly, evaluating the legality of intensive farming through the prism of its general ecological impacts is more readily reconcilable with the current legal framework of ecocide. In principle, this approach could be pursued without infringing upon the principle of legality—so long as it can be shown that the environmental degradation resulting from a given farming activity meets the requisite thresholds of severity, duration, and widespread effect, and that the socioeconomic costs of limiting such activity are not disproportionately high. Conversely, an interpretive change that conceptualizes environmental harm as encompassing direct harm to animals—on the grounds that they are sentient beings and integral constituents of ecosystems—would represent a more radical departure. Such a redefinition would signal not merely a legal development, but an ethical reorientation: one that acknowledges the moral status of animals as more than passive objects of environmental concern, and instead affirms their intrinsic value as co-inhabitants of the natural world.
There is reason to believe that global ethical attitudes toward animals will continue to evolve. I am firmly convinced that future generations will look back on the extreme cruelties of industrial agriculture with the moral clarity and condemnation they rightfully warrant. As ethical paradigms shift, legal interpretation may begin to reflect this moral progression. In time, an expanded conception of environmental harm—one that explicitly incorporates the large-scale, systematic suffering of animals caused by exploitative practices—may emerge as a basis for a revised or supplementary understanding of ecocide. Whether this evolution will require the articulation of entirely new legal constructs—such as the proposed crime of “animal ecocide” applicable to wild and wild-caught animals, or a broader international crime against animality (see also here) encompassing all sentient beings, including domesticated animals—remains to be seen. Nevertheless, reimagining animals not as incidental victims of environmental degradation, but as sentient, ecologically embedded beings whose welfare is directly implicated in environmental integrity, would constitute a profound and potentially transformative advancement in the legal protection of non-human life.
Can Ecocide Law Help Curb the Mass Exploitation and Killing of Animals?
Written by Jérôme de HemptinneIn a prior post on this blog, I examined whether the existing framework of international crimes—namely, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—could be mobilized to address the systemic exploitation and killing of animals. I concluded that the relevance of these crimes to such conducts is, at best, incidental. Primarily designed to protect human beings, international crimes offer legal safeguards to animals only indirectly, namely when the harm inflicted also affects human welfare. More fundamentally, such crimes were crafted to target exceptional human crises: armed conflict (war crimes), widespread or systematic attacks against civilian populations (crimes against humanity), and acts of extermination against specific human groups (genocide). They were never intended to confront the “normalized” structural violence routinely inflicted upon animals through practices like industrial farming, scientific experimentation, and habitat destruction. Yet, such forms of violence produce immense suffering and the mass death of animals on a global scale.
By contrast, the emerging legal concept of ecocide may offer a more conceptually promising and structurally inclusive regime. Unlike established international crimes, ecocide does not ground its normative foundation solely on the defense of human beings. Rather, it seeks to protect the environment as an autonomous legal interest—an entity external to, yet constitutive of, human existence, and one that intrinsically includes animals. By recognizing the environment as a subject of legal value in its own right, ecocide opens the possibility, at least in principle, of holding individuals—and, ideally corporate and institutional actors—accountable for large-scale harm inflicted upon animals, even where no direct injury to humans can be demonstrated.
This post explores how ecocide, as an emerging legal concept, could serve as a viable mechanism to address the mass confinement, abuse, and slaughter of animals in factory farming and other industrial practices (for a preliminary analysis of this issue, see here, pp. 8-10). For the purposes of this analysis, I rely on the definition suggested in 2021 by the Independent Expert Panel convened under the auspices of the Stop Ecocide International foundation. This definition—which has informed the proposals of Vanuatu, Fiji, and Samoa Islands to amend the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—reads as follows: “Ecocide means unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.” At the core of this framework lie three key conditions: first, that the act in question is either unlawful or wanton; second, that it results in environmental damage that is both severe and either widespread or long-term; and third, that the perpetrator had knowledge of the substantial likelihood of such harm. Each of these criteria presents specific challenges when applied to the systemic exploitation and slaughtering of animals, which will be examined in turn.
Defining the “Environment”: Do Animals Count?
Before evaluating the above constitutive elements, it is essential to consider whether animals—particularly those raised for food, such as cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens, ducks, or turkey—fall within the legal concept of the “environment.” The 2021 Expert Panel offers a broad definition of the environment which covers “the earth, its biosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, as well as outer space.” On its face, this definition appears to focus primarily on ecosystems and their associated wildlife. The status of domesticated animals is less clear. Indeed, these animals are often viewed through the lens of human utility, treated as economic assets rather than as integral parts of ecological systems. Under this traditional understanding, livestock are considered component of the environment only indirectly, namely when their exploitation leads to environmental degradation, such as deforestation, pollution, or greenhouse gas emissions. However, a more progressive interpretation—such as that advanced by A. Peters (here, p. 358) in the context of the laws of warfare, who notes that domesticated animals “are, after all, ‘natural’ and not man-made”—supports the inclusion of such animals within the notion of the environment. When this interpretation is considered alongside the growing ethical, legal, and scientific recognition of animal sentience, it becomes possible to conceptualized harm to animals—both wild and domesticated—as a direct form of environmental damage. On this reading, the suffering and death of farmed animals are not merely instrumental concerns (i.e., relevant only insofar as they affect ecosystems), but rather constitute intrinsic harm to the ecological whole. Environmental damage, in this broader sense, includes harm inflicted directly on domesticated animals themselves—not merely the secondary effects of their exploitation on the environment (for further discussion on the limitations of ecocide regime in addressing animal welfare, see the thought-provoking analysis of D. Legge and S. Brooman on ‘animal ecocide’, pp. 212–214).
Unlawfulness or Wantonness of Animal Exploitation
Having clarified the meaning of “environment,” I may now turn to the first foundational criterion of ecocide: the requirement that the act causing environmental harm be either unlawful or wanton (for a discussion of the challenges raised by these elements, see here). Presently, it cannot be argued that animal exploitation and killing for food is broadly unlawful. Indeed, such practices are legally permitted in most jurisdictions and are not prohibited under international law. Even existing animal welfare statutes generally operate within the framework that accepts ongoing exploitation, aiming primarily to minimize suffering rather than to challenge the legality of the practice itself (see here, p. 7; for a mapping of anti-cruelty laws, see here).
At first glance, the concept of wantonness, by contrast, may offer a more robust legal grounding for the protection of livestock. As defined by the Expert Panel, wanton acts are those undertaken with “reckless disregard for damage which would be clearly excessive in relation to the social and economic benefits anticipated.” While this standard appears promising, its application to animal agriculture presents considerable complexity. The livestock industry is not only deeply entrenched in global economic systems but is also widely portrayed—albeit with growing contestation—as essential to food security and socio-economic development. Consequently, determining whether the exploitation of animals meets the threshold of wantonness ultimately hinges on how courts evaluate the gravity of environmental harm and animal suffering in relation to the purported societal and economic benefits.
In other legal contexts, environmental damage has at times been tolerated where it serves urgent human needs—such as the construction of dams to prevent catastrophic flooding—or when the anticipated economic gains are deemed to outweigh the ecological costs. However, this utilitarian calculus becomes far more ethically and legally problematic when extended to sentient animals, particularly those raised in industrialized factory farming systems. Unlike inert environmental features, these animals are capable of experiencing pain, fear, and distress—qualities that fundamentally shift the moral and legal stakes. This raises a crucial yet often neglected question (first suggested to me by Lammert van Raan, former Dutch MP and initiator of the ecocide bill of July 2023): can the conditions under which such animals are confined—and ultimately slaughtered—ever be justified by any benefit to the animals themselves? In the overwhelming majority of cases, the answer is unequivocally negative. There exists no compensatory benefit to the animals that could plausibly offset the severe and often prolonged suffering they endure. This lack of justification underscores a fundamental asymmetry: the harm inflicted is vast and direct, while any alleged benefit accrues solely to humans. Under the standard of wantonness, such disproportionality renders the practice especially suspect. If courts were to fully account not only for the environmental degradation wrought by industrial agriculture but also for its direct, systemic impact on sentient beings, the balance of interests might change decisively. Such a reassessment could lead to the pivotal conclusion that these practices, far from being necessary or proportionate, in fact constitute wanton acts in violation of established international legal norms.
Finally, it is worth noting a significant divergence in national legislative approaches to these elements which may impact the protection of animal welfare. For example, the Dutch ecocide bill deliberately omits any requirement that the act be unlawful or wanton. Instead, it focuses solely on the scale and severity of the environmental harm caused. This broader, harm-based formulation provides a more flexible and expansive legal foundation—one that could, in principle, encompass the environmental consequences of animal exploitation, even when such practices remain legally permitted. By contrast, the Belgian law on ecocide adopted on 22 February 2024 embraces a markedly narrower conception, explicitly requiring that the act in question be unlawful—more specifically, according to the Belgian Conseil d’État, that it constitutes a violation of federal legislations or international regulations. This requirement imposes a stringent legal constraint, significantly limiting the scope of the ecocide framework. As a result, practices involving animal exploitation fall outside the reach of the Belgian law unless they are already explicitly prohibited under Belgian federal law or international law, regardless of their potentially devastating impact on ecosystems, biodiversity, and animal welfare
Severity, Scope, and Duration of Harm Caused to Animals
According to the second criteria, ecocide must involve environmental harm that is both severe and either widespread or long-term. Whether animal exploitation meets this threshold depends on the conception of “harm” and “environment” adopted. If one adheres to the conventional understanding—where animal suffering is relevant only insofar as it contributes to broader ecological damage—then ecocide liability depends on proving that the environmental consequences of animal exploitation are sufficiently grave, widespread or long-term. Mounting scientific evidence supports this view: industrial livestock production is a major driver of deforestation, biodiversity loss, water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions (see here, and here). By contrast, the progressive interpretation—where harm to animals is itself environmental harm—could further facilitate the possibility of reaching ecocide threshold. Indeed, the suffering endured by sentient beings in industrial farming is undoubtedly severe. The scale of harm is widespread, affecting over 500 million land animals daily, not including aquatic species. The question of whether such harm can be deemed long-term is more nuanced. From a species-level perspective, livestock are not at risk of extinction; their populations are systematically replenished to meet continuous human demand. However, if the legal lens shifts from the aggregate species to the experiential standpoint of the individual animal, a markedly different assessment arises. Each animal subjected to this system suffers an irreversible and premature death—an enduring and irremediable harm when viewed through the prism of individual sentience.
Knowledge of Likely Harm Caused to Animals
Finally, to establish ecocide, the perpetrator must possess the knowledge of a substantial likelihood that their actions will result in severe and either widespread or long-term environmental harm. As with other constitutive elements of the offence, the interpretation of the mental requirement is closely tied to the broader definitional question of whether—and how—livestock animals are considered part of the environment. On the one hand, under the traditional approach, it may be challenging to demonstrate intent or knowledge that environmental harm results primarily from the indirect consequences of animal exploitation. Typically, environmental degradation is regarded as an unintended and unforeseen side effect of otherwise lawful activities—although this view is increasingly being challenged. This raises complex issues about the standard of intent that ultimately needs to be adopted: should the perpetrator have acted with direct intent, indirect intent (dolus eventualis), or merely recklessness (for a discussion on the mental element of ecocide, see here)? On the other hand, if the progressive interpretation referred to above is retained, the legal analysis varies significantly. From this perspective, the exploitation and killing of farm animals are deliberate acts, carried out with full awareness of their consequences. Indeed, in light of the now well-established scientific evidence of animal sentience, such harm can no longer be dismissed as incidental. Rather, it constitutes the direct and foreseeable consequence of deliberate practices, carried out with full awareness of their significant and unavoidable impact on animal well-being.
Concluding Reflections: Ecocide, a Normative Point of Departure
The potential for the emerging crime of ecocide to serve as a meaningful legal instrument against the exploitation and mass killing of domesticated animals rests on a complex set of interrelated interpretive determinations. Chief among these are the definitional scope of the term “environment”, the extent to which this definition shapes the application of elements such as unlawfulness or wantonness, the assessment of whether harm to animals meets the ecocide threshold, and the requisite mental state of the perpetrator. While the current legal architecture of ecocide was not originally conceived to address the suffering of animals, it nonetheless offers a conceptual starting point for future legal evolution. Still, it should be regarded more as a foundational reference than a fully developed legal instrument for confronting widespread and serious harm to animals in farming activities. Under present legal and political constraints, it is exceedingly unlikely that a national prosecutor—or the ICC Prosecutor—would initiate proceedings against those involve in industrial farming practices solely on the basis of the current definition of ecocide, especially in the absence of a clear legal mandate and a broad societal consensus that such practices are intolerable and must be curtailed. Any such prosecution would almost certainly be viewed as incompatible with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
This legal caution must, however, be nuanced in light of the two interpretive approaches outlined above. Clearly, evaluating the legality of intensive farming through the prism of its general ecological impacts is more readily reconcilable with the current legal framework of ecocide. In principle, this approach could be pursued without infringing upon the principle of legality—so long as it can be shown that the environmental degradation resulting from a given farming activity meets the requisite thresholds of severity, duration, and widespread effect, and that the socioeconomic costs of limiting such activity are not disproportionately high. Conversely, an interpretive change that conceptualizes environmental harm as encompassing direct harm to animals—on the grounds that they are sentient beings and integral constituents of ecosystems—would represent a more radical departure. Such a redefinition would signal not merely a legal development, but an ethical reorientation: one that acknowledges the moral status of animals as more than passive objects of environmental concern, and instead affirms their intrinsic value as co-inhabitants of the natural world.
There is reason to believe that global ethical attitudes toward animals will continue to evolve. I am firmly convinced that future generations will look back on the extreme cruelties of industrial agriculture with the moral clarity and condemnation they rightfully warrant. As ethical paradigms shift, legal interpretation may begin to reflect this moral progression. In time, an expanded conception of environmental harm—one that explicitly incorporates the large-scale, systematic suffering of animals caused by exploitative practices—may emerge as a basis for a revised or supplementary understanding of ecocide. Whether this evolution will require the articulation of entirely new legal constructs—such as the proposed crime of “animal ecocide” applicable to wild and wild-caught animals, or a broader international crime against animality (see also here) encompassing all sentient beings, including domesticated animals—remains to be seen. Nevertheless, reimagining animals not as incidental victims of environmental degradation, but as sentient, ecologically embedded beings whose welfare is directly implicated in environmental integrity, would constitute a profound and potentially transformative advancement in the legal protection of non-human life.
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