Stevie Martin
About/Bio
Dr Stevie Martin is a Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Cambridge. She is also a fellow/bye-fellow at Fitzwilliam and King’s colleges (Cambridge) where she supervises constitutional law and tort law. Stevie’s research fields include human rights law, medical law and public law. Her doctoral thesis examined the human rights implications of the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales. Previously, she completed an LL.M at the University of Cambridge, receiving the Sir William Wade Prize for Civil Liberties and Human Rights. Stevie has trained as a solicitor in Queensland, Australia, and prior to undertaking the LL.M spent several years working as a Legal Associate in the Family Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Recently Published
A Domestic Court’s Attempt to Derogate from the ECHR on behalf of the United Kingdom: the implications of Covid-19 on judicial decision-making in the United Kingdom
April 9, 2020
Stevie Martin
It is perhaps trite to note that for many countries throughout the world Covid-19 represents an unprecedented (as least in terms of modern peacetime history) public health emergency. It is inevitable that during this time some decisions will be made that are controversial, both ethically and legally. It will take careful reflection in the wake of the pandemic…
The Charlie Gard Case: Behind the Hyperbole
July 21, 2017
Stevie Martin
This post is intended to be both a reply to Jakob Cornides’s post on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in the case of Charlie Gard and, relatedly, to provide clarification on several points raised in that post (and pervading content elsewhere) regarding the nature of the decisions confronting both the domestic courts…
The role of legitimacy and proportionality in the (supposedly absolute) prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment: the United Kingdom’s High Court decisions in DD v Secretary of State
December 22, 2015
Stevie Martin
In the United Kingdom High Court (Administrative) decision of DD v Secretary of State for Home Department [2014] (‘DD’) Ouseley J was required to consider, on a preliminary basis, whether the imposition of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure (‘TPIM’) (the successor of control orders) had violated the appellant’s right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment…
Popular articles by Stevie Martin
A Domestic Court’s Attempt to Derogate from the ECHR on behalf of the United Kingdom: the implications of Covid-19 on judicial decision-making in the United Kingdom
April 9, 2020
Stevie Martin
It is perhaps trite to note that for many countries throughout the world Covid-19 represents an unprecedented (as least in terms of modern peacetime history) public health emergency. It is inevitable that during this time some decisions will be made that are controversial, both ethically and legally. It will take careful reflection in the wake of the pandemic…
The Charlie Gard Case: Behind the Hyperbole
July 21, 2017
Stevie Martin
This post is intended to be both a reply to Jakob Cornides’s post on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in the case of Charlie Gard and, relatedly, to provide clarification on several points raised in that post (and pervading content elsewhere) regarding the nature of the decisions confronting both the domestic courts…
The role of legitimacy and proportionality in the (supposedly absolute) prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment: the United Kingdom’s High Court decisions in DD v Secretary of State
December 22, 2015
Stevie Martin
In the United Kingdom High Court (Administrative) decision of DD v Secretary of State for Home Department [2014] (‘DD’) Ouseley J was required to consider, on a preliminary basis, whether the imposition of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure (‘TPIM’) (the successor of control orders) had violated the appellant’s right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment…